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i argue that husserl’s concept of position-taking, Stellungnahme, is adequate to 
understand the idea of second nature as an issue of philosophical anthropology. i claim 
that the methodological focus must be the living subject that acts and lives among 
others, and that the notion of second nature must respond to precisely this fundamental 
active character of subjectivity. The appropriate concept should satisfy two additional 
desiderata. first, it should be able to develop alongside the biological, psychological, and 
social individual development. Second, it should be able to underlie the vast diversity 
of human beings within and across communities. as possible candidates, i contrast 
position-taking with two types of habit-like concepts: instinct and habitus, on the 
one hand, and customary habits, on the other. i argue that position-taking represents 
the active aspect of the subject while the habit-like concepts are passive. a subject’s 
position-takings and ensuing comportments are tied together by motivations, which 
evince a certain consistency, and for this reason are expression of the subject’s identity. 
i conclude by nuancing the relation between Stellungnahme and passivity. Passivity is 
deemed necessary to action but subservient to it; position-taking is thought to be prior to 
passivity.
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This paper argues that husserl’s concept of position-taking, Stellungnahme, 
specifically as developed in ideas ii, is adequate to understand the 
idea of second nature as an issue of a philosophical anthropology1. 
inter- and intra-cultural diversity among individuals and groups, as 
well as transhistorical variation in human activities, institutions, 
accomplishments, and even personal characteristics (all of which we take 
to be telling of who we are), give us reasons to think that our nature goes 
beyond our species-common biological nature. it seems then that what 
we are is not limited to our biological, first nature. But what goes beyond 
first nature is not, as i will show, separate from it: they both make up our 
second nature. how to think more concretely about this unity/duality? 
i argue that what we are is manifest in a particular way in the diversity 
and complexity of human activities. in thinking about second nature, 
my interest will be to try to get some clarity about the level in which it 
is possible to locate the union of both a biologically and a non-biological 
aspect at work in the historically-situated everyday life of human beings, 
who are social in nature, and to articulate that connection.
in everyday life the subject’s acts are not isolated peaks2. actions belong 
together in two senses: they express a certain internal consistency in their 
motivations and they issue from the same subject. Thus, second nature 
is looked for in that which connects the sequences of motivations that 
underlie a person’s doings. This connection i identify as dispositional. 
Position-taking or Stellungnahme, i hold, is the right dispositional concept 
to articulate  the notion of second nature. 
1 husserl’s works are referenced according to the husserliana edition, save for experience and 
Judgment. non-enclosed numbers correspond to the english translation cited; page numbers of 
the german edition are given within angle brackets, where available.
2 i use the terms “subject” and “person” synonymously. They refer to the actual being that 
is essentially embodied and historical and has an intersubjective dimension. i use sometimes 
“living subject” for emphasis. my referent is not the pure or transcendental ego (save as a 
stratum in the multilayered constitution of the subject). 
my commitment to such a conception of the subject, among other things, puts me apart from 
a number of Husserl commentators that insist that Husserl accounts first and foremost for a 
transcendental consciousness as the essence of subjectivity. it also distinguishes my account 
from recent influential investigations, such as Crowell’s recent book (2013), who argues that while 
husserl may have seen the necessity to account for a richer subject, in the manner above described, 
his theoretical commitments rendered him unable to accomplish such project. To put it in crowell’s 
terms, the type of normativity that is manifest in the pragmatically-embedded life of the subject is 
beyond the reach of husserl’s phenomenology. i oppose such reading. This paper can be seen as an 
argument for the presence of such type of normativity in the husserl.   
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it conveys the idea that in everyday life a subject does not simply face 
pre-given things in a pre-given way. rather, she orients herself in relation 
to things, people, states of affairs, etc. This orienting herself is broad 
in its operation as it ranges from basic levels (e.g. sensory acquaintance 
with things) all the way up to complex activities, and is always and 
preeminently active. Since it has been the explicit aim of this special 
issue—habits: Second nature and Social reality—to invite accounts of habit, my 
paper has the intention of offering a counterpart to positions positively 
centered on that concept. 
in §1 i argue that since the concept of motivation is at the core of the 
phenomenological and ontological priority of active subjectivity that 
husserl endorses in ideas ii, and motivations can be understood as 
dispositions, the issue of second nature can be framed in terms of the 
appropriate dispositional concept. i then offer a list of desiderata for the 
right dispositional concept, and define and locate two groups of habit-
like concepts in relation to those desiderata. in §2 i offer an account of 
Stellungnahme. in doing so, i offer arguments for the primacy of active 
subjectivity, and for the connections Stellungnahme-motivation and, issuing 
from it, Stellungnahme-identity. in §3 i clarify my stance on position-taking 
and passivity arguing that position-taking has phenomenological and 
epistemological priority over passivity. i do not identify position-taking 
with the whole sphere of activity and i do not discount that there are passive 
bases, both innate and acquired, that are essential to position-taking.
husserl conceives the living subject in its everyday concreteness as the 
subject that acts, judges, perceives, makes decisions, desires, etc. on this 
view, the subject is constituted by a series of layers or strata. her actions are 
motivated, that is, they are animated by influences of different sorts: needs 
of pragmatic engagements with things or people, value considerations, and 
also biological drives and instincts, and psychic rigid habits that we have 
acquired.
our second nature is manifest in our active life, but it is rooted in the 
biological and in the habitual (hua 4, 267, <255>). in speaking of the 
underlying basis of the subject, husserl says that “in a certain sense 
there is, in the obscure depths, a root soil” (hua 4, 291–292, <279>)3. The 
metaphor points to a hidden ground that is difficult to investigate not only 
because it is beyond the reach of our awareness, but also because it is deep 
and its elements are buried. despite this obscurity, it is essential to the 
3 “es ist gewissermaßen ein wurzelboden da in dunklen Tiefen” (hua 4, <279>). See also 
Supplement Xii to hua 4.
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account i offer to see everyday actions as grounded in such multilayered 
substrate. although i address second nature through an active concept, 
the partly passive, underlying sphere must be kept in sight, so that my 
account is sensitive to the complexity of the subject matter and proves to 
be compatible with and answerable to the ground on which it is rooted. 
husserl’s theory of constitution provides a way to investigate the issue of 
second nature, for it looks for the structure of lived experiences through 
an inquiry into the constitution of the experiencing subject. Before i get 
there, i would like to propose some criteria to guide the inquiry.  
at the core of the active subject are complexes of dispositions, product of 
physiological and biological dependencies, and of earlier experiences (hua 
4, 143, <136>), and this is why the question of second nature should framed 
as an investigation into the most adequate dispositional concept. The 
right dispositional concept should satisfy two groups of desiderata. First, 
there is an ontogenetic aspect: the right dispositional structure should 
be able to change alongside biological, personal, and social individual 
development. a second group relates to variations between different 
subjects: the right dispositional structure should be plastic enough so as 
to adapt to biological differences between human beings, including those 
of subjects with disabilities, and to underlie cultural and intersubjective 
variations of humans, such as languages and modes of relating to the 
world affectively, cognitively, or in value terms. 
husserl’s mid-to-late philosophy accords an increasing importance to 
passive structures and processes, habit being their chief representative, 
so it is just natural to consider them in the present discussion. The idea 
of habit is, in quite general terms, the idea that some aspects of our 
experiential engagement with the world become habitual and ground our 
experiential life in general. while i agree that the domain of passivity does 
play a central role in our experiential life, i do not think that it is the right 
concept to be at the center of a philosophical anthropology. let me explore 
two habit-like formations. 
on one extreme we have hard, biologically-based instincts and habitus, 
that is, sedimented (sometimes thickly sedimented) cognitive or 
affective opinions (hua 4, 267, <255>). habitus refers to a type of knowledge 
constituting a horizon of “familiarity and precognizance” that, by means 
of a certain anticipation, underlies the objects’ coming to be experienced 
as they actually are experienced (experience and Judgment, 121-123). in 
other words, habitus is “a residue of past life that informs the current 
perceptions, thought and actions of the ego” (Biceaga 2010, 68; see also hua 
4, 118, <111>). in the process of the explicative thematization of an object, 
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for instance, this sedimented knowledge is responsible for assigning (or 
awakening) a sense to different aspects of the object as it is given in time 
(experience and Judgment, 112–124). The origin of habitus is the repetition 
of similar instances that fixes a sense and makes it become latent in 
cognitive and belief expectation (hua 11, 238–241, <188–191>).
instinct and habitus are passive even when they play a role in activities. 
instincts and bodily-based habitualities (e.g. being raised as right-
handed even if one ‘is’ left-handed) are closer to pure passivity (Biceaga 
2010, 68). But even more complex cases of habitus—say habitus at play in 
recognizing a social dynamic—are passive because the person, without 
much resistance, ‘accepts’ what is suggested by habitus. The fact that 
we can ‘fight’ or ‘overcome’ some of these ‘suggestions’ (perhaps not the 
instinctual ones), and on occasion intendedly yield to them, only shows 
that it is possible to more actively relate to them, not that they are not 
passive. 
on other extreme we have customary habits: having a coffee in the 
morning, crossing one’s arms, putting too much salt in food, etc. although 
habits are evidence of our second nature in that, for instance, they are 
not instinctual and can vary from culture to culture and from person to 
person, they are too concrete and specific, and for that reason are not the 
type of concept we are after. it should be possible, though, to account for 
them through the right concept. 
it does not seem then that either instincts and habitus, or customary 
habits are the concepts that can successfully articulate the idea of second. 
even when closely woven into action, “the ego’s participation […] is usually 
minimal and removed from introspective reach” (Biceaga 2010, 69). 
methodologically these passive formations can help delimit the 
dispositional concept i am after. we can think that the right dispositional 
concept should be in between these two extremes: the passive formations 
that underlie our acquaintance with objects (instincts and habitus), 
and specific repetitive behaviors (habits) that, while a form of activity, 
are more like end-products or peaks of action, in which the subject 
yields to fixed ways of doing things. As to habits, in addition to minimal 
participation and lack of introspection, they are not productive in the 
sense a structure of subjectivity would be and are all-too-specific to be 
the concepts we are looking for: habits do not underlie the wide variety of 
activities of which they themselves are but instances. 
in the next section i will offer an account of position-taking as the most 
adequate dispositional concept to understand the second nature of 
persons.
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The notion of position-taking conveys the idea that in everyday life 
a subject does not simply face pre-given things in a pre-given way 
and executes pre-delineated actions upon them. Rather, she first and 
foremost orients herself in relation to things, others, states of affairs, 
etc. The general orientation that precedes and gives rise to the situation, 
and guides the moments of explicit action is a taking of position. 
Position-taking sets the tone, as it were, for the essentially interpretive 
acquaintance between subject and things, on which the very definition 
or thematization of those things depends, and it maintains or changes 
that tone in ensuing comportments. in this sense, it has a broad range of 
action. The concept of position-taking is also broad in that it applies to 
different domains of acquaintance with things (sensory, perceptually, 
logically, affectively, inferentially, etc.). 
Say i am walking in the street and there is a car parked near me. i may 
notice the car or not. i may only notice the presence of a big object without 
thematizing it as a car. if i notice it, i may notice it in many ways: noticing 
its color or not, noticing where it is exactly parked, etc. my way of noticing 
it or not somehow depends on what i am doing: perhaps i am rushing to 
get somewhere and my surroundings are not something i have an interest 
in, except for the purposes of efficiency. My level of awareness of the car is 
also related to my pragmatic engagement with it: if i barely notice the bulk 
i may be able to avoid it (and vice versa too), and my noticing it without 
awareness of model or color may be enough for a more involved pragmatic 
relation, such as intently standing behind it while another car goes by. 
in all these cases, i take a position, even if only derivatively, in respect to 
the car. Thus, when i am in the vicinity of a car, it is not the case that i 
always encounter a car as such, with its many characteristics, and that my 
perceptions, actions and reactions about it can be defined objectively. This 
simplified scenario is the type of situation I have in mind.  
in inquiring about second nature, the explanandum is the second nature 
of the whole person, of “the subject of actual life” (hua 4, Supplement Xiii, 
382-383, <372-373>). According to Husserl’s theory of constitution, chiefly as 
developed in ideas ii, the person is constituted by multiple levels. These levels 
are different ego-formations, ranging (in broad strokes) from a bodily level, to 
the theoretical-transcendental pure ego, to the empirical, intersubjective ego 
of everyday life. let me illustrate by focusing on two levels. 
The aesthetic body is a system that pairs sensory occurrences with 
subjective occurrences in the body, and in an important sense determines 
“what it is that, as world, stands over and against the subject” (hua 4, 
70–80, <65–75>). This corporeal self [ichleib] has the particularity of being a 
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center of reference in relation to which perceptual happenings take place: 
perceived things are above, to the left, they are disgusting or agreeable, 
actable upon or not, etc. (hua 4, 61, <56>; hua 16, 1997, 124, <148>). 
another stratum is that of the “pure ego”, achieved by self-reflection in 
abstraction from the body (hua 4, 103, <97>). The pure ego is the abstract 
intentional unity in which the same I-feeling is attached to the same flow 
of consciousness and that is common to all intentional acts. 
These abstract formations are at work in the pragmatic involvement of 
subjects in the world. These strata do not ‘act’ isolatedly or modularily: the 
workings of the simpler, more basic strata are constitutive of the activities 
of ‘higher’, more comprehensive levels (hua 4 hua 4, 70–71, 269, 292–293 
<66, 257, 280>). let us take the case of perception as an illustration of 
different levels at work in the actual life of a subject. 
Take, for instance, the müller-lyer (so-called) illusion (Fig.1). To this day, the 
müller-lyer lines are taken by most as evidence of a universal characteristic 
featuring both the representational character of perception and its modular 
character (one can’t see the lines of equal length despite knowing they are 
so). as some social psychologists have shown, however, there is nothing 
universal or necessary about the perception of the drawing. Some people, the 
San foragers of the Kalahari, do not see the illusion. Further, the differences 
in perceived length between the two lines varies across populations (henrich, 
heine, and norenzayan 2010, 62). according to the authors of this study, it may 
be that the exposure to “‘carpentered corners’ of modern environments may 
favor certain optical calibrations and visual habits that create and perpetuate 
this illusion” (2010, 62). Whether it is specifically the exposure to carpentered 
corners or other complex social influences, what is crucial here is that this 
case illustrates husserl’s claim that the bodily dimension does not act in 
isolation but is influenced by intersubjective and pragmatic constraints. The 
perceptual element is not simply about what sensations follow what sensory 
worldly occurrences. it is about ways of encountering, taking in, and relating 
to worldly occurrences: it is a taking of position. 
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husserl does not claim that the perceptual is the bodily dimension alone, 
but that the perceptual is partly constituted by the sensory, bodily level. 
nor does husserl claim, that the sensory or bodily is only biological 
or physiological. The workings of the body are active in meaningful 
perception, but personal and intersubjective strata also shape a person’s 
sensitivity or even a person’s way of ‘using’ the senses. i am now in the 
position to offer a fuller articulation of position-taking.
The subject is active, and being active means taking position vis-à-vis 
things, objects, goals, etc. (hua 4, 226-238, <215–226>). For husserl, the 
genuine sense of subjectivity belongs to the ego that acts upon things, 
makes decisions about her life, perceives objects—that one who attends, 
compares, is attracted or repulsed, etc. (hua 4, 224-225, <213>; hua 11, 16-19, 
<362-364>). The subject that relates to things in the world is not a universal, 
abstract subject, but rather a being that is individualized in her own 
constitution as “a person among persons” (hua 4, Suppl. Xiii, 382, <372>).  
The person is, for these reasons, not conceived of as a substance in which 
properties or capacities inhere, but rather as an active being in which a 
complex underlying basis is in action and is made manifest in the way things 
are dealt with, as well as in the things that are dealt with. in exercising 
faculties and habits the subject takes position and determines relational 
stances regarding things (hua 4, 265, <253>). 
This position-taking of the person is the pragmatic thematization of a relation 
of the subject with aspects of the world (hua 4, 119–120, <112–113>). This 
means that position-taking, as a relational structure of subjectivity, does 
not only refer to individual, isolated position-takings. There is a broader 
connection between position-takings and the subject, and the key is the 
notion of motivation: “my thesis, my position-taking, my deciding from 
motives […] is something i have a stake in” (hua 4, 119, <122>)4. 
The causality of motivation is central for husserl because the subjective 
relation with the surrounding world is not a causal relation, governed 
by causal, physical conditionalities, but one governed by the nexus of 
motivations, that is, by the type of animating power that guides the 
meaningful, pragmatic relation with things that intentional beings like us 
have.  husserl refers to motivation also as the “lawfulness of the life of the 
spirit” (hua 4, 231, <220>). To say that lawfulness belongs to motivation 
means that there exists a certain agreement of motives, a type of consistency. 
we can see this consistency, for instance, in the character of a person. 
if, as i have said, the subject is an ongoing taking of position animated by 
4  “meine Thesis, meine Stellungnahme, mein auf die motive hin mich-entscheiden […] ist 
meine Sache” (hua 4 1989, <122>).  
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consistent motives, the identity of the subject is to be found precisely in the 
consistency evinced in her position-takings and comportments. in husserl’s 
terms, it is part of the idea of a subject that the subject is the same in all her 
position-takings, and that in all her position-takings the subject is the same: 
“as long as i am the one i am, then the position-taking cannot but ‘persist’, 
and i cannot but persist in it” (hua 4, 118–119, <111–112>). 
in this case, to say that the identity of the subject is to be found in her 
consistent position-takings and ensuing comportments means that such 
position-takings are expression of herself (Flynn 2009, 67). The whole 
person, as a psychophysical unit that exists over time, expresses herself 
in the bodily, active, ongoing engagement with things in the world. The 
subject is, as a subject, nothing else than her position-takings and ensuing 
comportments. We may say that we find in a person a style of being, a mode 
of acting, a host of tendencies and preferences. we should rather say that 
it is in those things—in her position-takings—where we find the person5. 
This is not to say, though, that in a changing stream of consciousness 
and lived experiences, the subject is ever fully defined. Husserl says that 
“the subject develops by living” (hua 4, 264, <252>), which means that it 
is more precise to speak of an ongoing, interactive correlation between 
subject and activities, such that the subject determines those activities 
and is at the same time influenced and further shaped by those activities 
themselves (see hua 4, Supplements Vii, X).
it follows also from this framework that the identity of a subject is not 
strictly an individual issue. insofar as position-taking features ways 
of relating towards things, others, and events, and those ways come 
oftentimes from others (e.g. upbringing and cultural ways of doing things), 
Stellungnahme is partly intersubjectively constituted. Personal character 
and style are then partly constituted by others, and in this sense husserl 
says that “this influence determines personal development, whether or 
not the person himself subsequently realizes it, remembers it, or is capable
5  husserl’s two main conceptions of expression and the shift from one to the other, from the 
investigations to ideas ii, are explored in detail by Flynn (2009). on the early conception, modeled 
after the linguistic sign, expression operates with two separate things, one of which expresses 
the other, the expressed being the essential one. in contrast, the view husserl endorses in ideas 
ii talks about an intimation between a subjective aspect and a bodily manifestation, that is, so 
‘close’ a connection that it is not the case that interiority is expressed in exteriority, but that 
the “interiority” coexists with “exteriority” (68). The body does not simply indicate subjective 
states because, first, the body itself is not just materiality—it is not Körper but leib, living body—, 
and second, because the body itself in its being animated—or the subjective aspects being 
embodied—constitutes a type of unity that only exists in that intimation, which is in this case the 
human being herself as a particular type of reality (67). The extension i propose of the treatment 
Flynn offers of exteriority and body is that they are properly nowhere to be ‘seen’ or intuited but 
in position-takings and ensuing comportments.
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 of determining the degree of the influence and its character” (hua 4, 281, <268>)6. 
in the following section i will offer a few closing remarks nuancing the 
relation between position-taking and passivity.
my argument for Stellungnahme rests on the consideration that the person 
is essentially active: it is “the [personal] ego that in any sense is “active” 
and takes a position” (hua 4, 225, <213>). on that basis i argue that the 
active position-taking has priority over passivity, and that this priority is 
phenomenological and epistemological. Passivity, embodied in instinct, 
habitus and habit, is necessary for subjectivity to take place, but is 
subservient to position-takings7. 
husserl examines the relation between passive and active aspects in the 
analyses and says that despite the central role of passivity, consciousness 
of objects is “genuinely carried out only first in egoic acts” (hua 11, 274, <3>, 
emphases mine). Position-taking is phenomenologically prior to passivity 
because it pertains to first-person experience, where meaning is located; 
whereas other underlying strata, subpersonal or unconscious, are not 
meaningful in the first-person sense. Epistemologically, position-taking is 
prior to passivity because first-person experience is the proper source of 
knowledge and is also known first and more directly; whereas underlying 
strata are only known indirectly (some only transcendentally) as they reveal 
themselves in first-person experience. 
 Position-taking cannot exist without the passive sphere. The subject that 
acts—that perceives, grasps, remembers, values, etc.—possesses, as it were, 
a passive ground that makes it possible, in the most fundamental sense, 
6  My proposal is broadly compatible with scientific accounts of the origins of human 
cognition such as Tomasello’s (2009). on his view, human cognition is the product of a 
historical and ontogenetical development of cognitive skills on the basis of a set of phylogenetic 
characteristics (2009, 10–12).
7  my account of position-takings is not an account of the sphere of activity. There is a good 
reason: there are specific activities that are passive in the relevant sense, which is a certain 
deciding freely according to motives. when trying to suggest a relativization and softening of 
the relation activity/passivity, Biceaga argues, for instance, that receptivity is a type of “activity 
in passivity” which defies the opposition between “passive receptivity as the ego’s undergoing 
of something and judicative activity as the ego’s doing something in response to its being passively 
affected from without” (2010, xix, emphasis in the original). Thoroughly habitual doings are 
actions in the obvious sense that the body moves, but they are entirely passive in that the free 
ego, as it were, hardly intervenes and the action is beyond introspection and even perhaps beyond 
awareness. 
on the other hand, position-taking is not a simple voluntaristic account of actions. in the course, 
for instance, of a time-extended pragmatic endeavor in which one interacts with several objects 
for the sake of the whole, like cooking a meal, position-taking refers more to the whole, and the 
way specific interactions are part of that whole orientation—consistency of motivations—rather 
than to each individual engagement with an object. This is why the issue of wanting to do each 
individual action is relatively unimportant, and why ‘activity’ in the traditional conception of 
‘what is done’ is entirely flat-footed, even inadequate, for the present purposes. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that the whole pragmatic engagement is active. 
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for objects to be objects for consciousness. in a way, the passive sphere is 
active in the being active of the subject, and this also shows that “activity 
and passivity are inseparable and mutually dependent” (Biceaga 2010, 
2010, xix). 
addressing this complex relation, husserl writes:
[The fullness of the person is] the ego as human, the ‘i take a 
position’, the i think, i value, i act, i complete works, etc. Then there 
also belongs to me a basis of lived experiences and a basis of nature 
(“my nature”) which is manifest in the play of lived experiences. 
This nature is the lower psychic layer, but it extends even into the 
sphere of position taking: the position-taking ego is dependent on 
its substratum insofar as i, in order to be motivated in my position 
taking, must have precisely the motivating lived experiences, 
which stand in an associative nexus and under rules of associative 
dispositions. (hua 4, 293, <280>)
I would like to finish by going back to the botanic metaphor I invoked 
at the beginning of §1, in which husserl referred to the lower levels on 
which position-taking depends as the obscure depths of roots. There lie 
the underlying bases, biological and habitual, of the life of the person. i 
would like to suggest now that the metaphor is not a mere illustration but 
a genuine way of understanding the complexity of human beings in the 
constitutional sense. The power of the metaphor has been felt by more 
than one philosopher. Buber spoke of the spirit as nature’s blossom. in his 
gay Science, nietzsche says “like trees we grow – it’s hard to understand, 
like all life! – not in one place, but everywhere; not in one direction, but 
upwards and outwards and inwards and downwards equally; our energy 
drives trunk, branches, and roots all at once” (2001, §371, 236). nietzsche’s 
metaphor supplements husserl’s reference to a deep root soil. The relation 
between roots and trunk and branches is not only one of groundedness, but 
also one of productive development. Trunk and branches also exert pressure 
downwards and drive the roots to new developments, and those new root-
configurations becomes renewed ground for even the highest of leafs.
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